In the short term, it will be extremely difficult for Kabila and Zimbabwe to turn against their allies and disarm them. Kabila does not share the ideology of the former FAR and interahamwe, although he called for an anti-Tutsi campaign in August 1998, but he may need it to right his armed forces in the event of a ceasefire break. He could easily integrate some of them into his own national army and pretend that they are Congolese. On 10 July 1999 in Lusaka, the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement in Lusaka, after a year of failed attempts by SADC and other agents of power to find a solution to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This war is the second to take place on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo in the space of two years and to oppose the allies of the first war: rebels supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have tried to overthrow Kabila by military option, while Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia intervened on behalf of the SADC to protect the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the government of Kabila. For the first time, the Lusaka Agreement addresses the separate disputes taking place in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the Congolese agenda. However, the commitment of the parties remains suspect and violence cannot be excluded. The ceasefire agreement recommends that the training of the national army be done after Congolese political negotiations. The agreement contradicts itself by emptying Congolese contributions and recommending that the formation of a new Congolese national army revolve around the current armed parties, which are the government forces, the coercive armed forces of the RCD and the MLC. This is a mistake because other Congolese political parties and civil society are not yet taking a position on the nature of the new national army. Giving armed belligerents leeway is dangerous, because the new national army will serve the interests of its masters and not the Congolese people. Both the rebels and the Kabila government represent the armed side of the conflict and, by giving them the power to form the new national army, unarmed political parties are marginalized. The Congolese people want peace and welcome the Lusaka agreement as a step in that direction.
However, the restoration of social services and the improvement of the economic situation are a prerequisite for lasting peace. The population increasingly sees militia groups, including the Mai-Mai, as predatory forces and is distancing themselves from them. Despite the uncertainty, reconciliation efforts are underway in the Kivus, for example between the May-May leaders and the Banyamulenge. They are also still conquering Mbuji Mayi, which would be an important turning point in the war and would radically change the balance of power. However, such an offensive would cause heavy casualties, given that Zimbabweans are still in Mbuji Mayi, and the political price of taking the city after the signing of the ceasefire would be very high. Relations between Uganda and Rwanda deteriorated further when Kabila and Museveni signed the Sirte Agreement in Libya on 19 April, which called for a ceasefire, the sending of African peacekeeping forces, the withdrawal of foreign troops and an inclusive internal dialogue for the Congolese. After the signing of the agreement, Uganda withdrew some troops and equipment. However, Rwandans said they had never been consulted on the initiative. Pressure is also being exerted on the rebels to sign the U.S. agreement, which “strongly but tacitly” supports a regional solution to the conflict. Although the United States did not play a leading role in the negotiations, it actively engaged behind the scenes.