The authorities clearly show that the strength of the promise does not depend on a personal benefit or benefit to the promisor. See Fried v. Fisher, above, 115 A.L.R. 149, 150, where it is said: “O” was thus recognized from the very beginning that an Estoppel could be born in the same way from obtaining a promise, even if the intention was to assert the promise and to assert it, and to refuse to enforce it, to sanction the expulsion of fraud or the result of fraud.” In an early statement from Michigan, it is stated that “the rule is not based on the assumption that he [the estopped party] has obtained any personal benefit or benefit, but on the fact that he has pushed others to act in such a way that they are seriously affected if he is not authorized to implement what he has given them.” Faxton v. Faxon, 28 Mich. 159, quoted in 115 A.L.R. (supra) page 159.  III. We do not understand that the defendant challenges the mere assertion that a just Estoppel could be effective in removing a transaction from status or, more specifically, that the status does not distract oral evidence from the promise as the basis for a just Estoppel. He argues, however, that “the applicant has not demonstrated the following essential elements of the Estoppel: (1) a clear and unequivocal oral agreement; 2) that this applicant, to his detriment, acted only by invoking this agreement; (3) this applicant was unbeknownst to the actual facts; (4) misrepresentation or concealment of essential facts; (5) that the balancing of all actions gives the applicant the right to fairly lighten Estoppel`s burden.” It is obvious (3) and (4) does not apply to the change of sola estoppel when complainants rely on a promise rather than a misrepresentation of the facts.
There were no unknown facts here that must have been misrepresented or hidden. Age 2. Evidence that the party seeking to enforce the agreement has reasonably relied on it, … The Tribunal, recognizing the close link between the partial benefit (as a form of consideration) and the change in sola, noted that Code 622.33 not only refers to certain acts of partial benefit as an exception, but also “any other circumstance which, under the law in force to date, would have brought the case out of the law of fraud”. We believe that this language is sufficient to include what is now called “Promissory estoppel.” See Bird v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 294 pp. 687, 75 A.L.R. 639; Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank Trust Co., 124 Conn.
507, 1 A.2d 146, 149, 117 A.L.R. 932, 936 ff. We do not go any further on the transactions between VanderWal and, as complainants, do not appear to have relied on an agreement between these two. The case is however essential as the introduction and explain what the complainant said, he told the defendant about this already mentioned at their conference when the verbal agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is made. It also tends to confirm the applicant`s statement that the defendant later gave him definitive assurance. Perhaps the apparent difficulty could be met, as the analogous situation has always been met by contract law, in cases where the promisor does not benefit from it, but where the promise is at a disadvantage. In such cases, we were always thinking. See quotes in West Iowa Digest, Contracts, Key No. But “reflection” is a broader term as a “partial benefit” and that is where the statute defines certain acts of partial benefit that are not technically descriptive for those shown in this case.