The ban on vertical restrictions applies to all “businesses,” including public entities performing non-governmental economic functions. Among the government`s sovereign missions are government activities dealing with nuclear energy, money, defence, space, etc. In other words, if a public body engages in economic activity, its conduct would be subject to review under the Competition Act. The Competition Act provides for the agreement to include, in consultation, any agreement, agreement or act (i) if it is an agreement, an agreement or a formal or written act; or (ii) whether such an agreement, understanding or act is to be enforceable through judicial proceedings. Is it then possible to ask the authority responsible for enforcing the rules on cartels and abuse of dominant position, in the absence of a formal notification procedure, indications or a decision to stop a court on the assessment of a particular agreement in certain circumstances? There are cases where certain types of agreements do not automatically fall within the scope of Article 101 of the TFUE, for example. B: Is there a procedure in which individuals can complain to the cartel enforcement authority and abuse of dominant position about allegedly illegal vertical restrictions? It is only when a contextual assessment has a “sufficiently damaging” effect on competition (or the absence of credible welfare virtues) that an agreement can be considered an “object” within the meaning of Article 101, paragraph 1, of the EUTF.  Is it necessary for a formal agreement to be reached in writing to introduce an application for agreement on cartels and abuse of dominance with respect to vertical restrictions, or can the relevant rules be reached by an informal or unwritten agreement? A selective distribution system that limits the delivery of goods to companies other than those authorized by the seller will likely be considered by the ICC as an “exclusive distribution agreement” in accordance with the basic rule. The Competition Act does not expressly require the ICC to take into account the supplier`s market share in assessing vertical restrictions. However, the ICC generally finds only vertical restrictions that raise concerns when imposed by companies with some market power. On several occasions, the ICC rejected allegations of vertical restrictions for which suppliers` market shares were insignificant. For example, in 2015, the ICC rejected allegations of anti-competitive vertical restrictions on an FMCG producer on the grounds that the supplier that imposed the restrictions was not in a position to have sufficient market power. Similarly, the ICC considered that the presence of other players does not hinder multi-brand competition in the fmCG sector (Ghanshyam Dass Vij v Bajaj Corp Ltd – Ors (Case 68 of 2013) (Ghanshyam Das Vij) (Ghanshyam Das Vij)). Restricting the area in which a seller is allowed to sell a product is considered by the ICC to be an “exclusive distribution agreement” and prohibited if this causes or risks causing an AAEC in India.
With respect to the assessment of territorial restrictions, the ICC should examine the impact of these restrictions on intra-brand and inter-brand competition and also be guided by the market power of the parties.